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Given the diversity of languages, it is unlikely that the human capacity for language 
resides in rich universal syntactic machinery. More likely, it resides centrally in the 
capacity for  vocal learning combined with a distinctive ethology for communicative 
interaction, which together (no doubt with other capacities) make diverse languages 
learnable. This chapter focuses on  face-to-face communication, which is character-
ized by the mapping of sounds and multimodal signals onto speech acts and which 
can be deeply recursively embedded in interaction structure, suggesting an interactive 
origin for complex syntax. These actions are recognized through  Gricean intention 
recognition, which is a kind of “ mirroring” or simulation distinct from the classic 
mirror neuron system. The multimodality of  conversational interaction makes evident 
the involvement of body, hand, and mouth, where the burden on these can be shifted, 
as in the use of speech and gesture, or hands and face in  sign languages. Such shifts 
having taken place during the course of human evolution. All this suggests a slightly 
different approach to the mystery of music, whose origins should also be sought in 
 joint action, albeit with a shift from  turn-taking to simultaneous expression, and with 
an affective quality that may tap ancient sources residual in primate vocalization. The 
deep connection of language to music can best be seen in the only universal form of 
music, namely  song.
Introduction
To approach the issues surrounding the relationship between language and mu-
sic tangentially, I argue that the language sciences have largely misconstrued 
the nature of their object of study. When  language is correctly repositioned as 
a quite elaborate cultural superstructure resting on two biological columns, as 
it were, the relationship to music looks rather different.
This chapter puts forth the following controversial position: Languages vary 
too much for the idea of “ universal grammar” to offer any solid explanation 
of our exclusive language capacity. Instead we need to look directly for our 
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biological endowment for language, communication, and culture. Part of this 
may involve the neural circuitry that is activated in language use (see Hagoort 
and Poeppel, this volume), although the innate nature of this is still unresolved, 
since it apparently develops in part parallel to the learning of language (Brauer 
et al. 2011b). Two systems, however, clearly contribute to our native  language-
ready capacities: (a) an evolved set of interactive abilities, which makes it pos-
sible to learn the cultural traditions we call languages, and (b) a specialized vo-
cal-learning system (an auditory-vocal loop). These two systems have distinct 
neurocognitive bases and different phylogenetic histories. Judging from traces 
of parallel material culture, system (a) is well over 1.5 million years old—a time 
period when system (b) was not yet in place. Here I concentrate on system (a), 
our interactive abilities, because its contribution to linguistic capacity has not 
been properly appreciated. I begin with a brief description of this story and then 
explore its implications for language, music, and their interrelation.
Language Diversity and Its Implications
Let  us begin with the observation that human communication systems are 
unique in the animal world in varying across social groups on every level of 
form and meaning. There are some 7000 languages, each differing in sound 
systems, syntax, word formation, and meaning distinctions. New information 
about the range of language diversity and its historical origins has undercut 
the view that diversity is tightly constrained by “universal grammar” or a 
language-specialized faculty or mental module (Evans and Levinson 2009). 
Common misconceptions, enshrined in the generative approach to language 
universals, are that all languages use syntactic phrase structure as the essential 
foundation for expressing, for example, grammatical relations, or that all lan-
guages use CV syllables (a Consonant followed by a Vowel), or have the same 
basic set of word classes (e.g., noun, verb, adjective). Instead, some languages 
make little or no use of surface phrase structure or immediate constituents, not 
all languages use CV syllables, and many languages have word classes (like 
ideophones, classifi ers) that are not found in European languages. The entire 
apparatus of  generative grammar fails to have purchase in languages that lack 
phrase structure (e.g., the so-called “binding conditions” that control the dis-
tribution of refl exives and reciprocals). Nearly all language universals posited 
by generative grammarians have exceptions in one set of languages or another.
The other main approach to language universals, due to Greenberg (1966), 
escapes this dilemma by aiming for strong statistical tendencies rather than 
exceptionless structural constraints. The claim would then be that if most lan-
guages follow a tendency for specifi c structures, this refl ects important biases 
in human cognition. Greenberg suggested, for example, that languages tend to 
have “harmonic”  word orders, so that if a language has the verb at the end of 
the clause, it will have postpositions that follow the noun phrase (rather than 
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prepositions that precede the noun phrase). Dryer (2008) has recently tested a 
great range of such predictions, with apparently good support. These general-
izations rely on sampling many languages, both related and unrelated; one can 
hardly avoid related languages because a few large language families account 
for most of the languages of the world. One problem that then arises is that re-
lated languages may be similar just because they have inherited a pattern from 
a common ancestor. One recent solution has been to control for relatedness 
by looking at, for example, word order wholly within large language families. 
It turns out that the Greenbergian generalizations about harmonic  word order 
do not hold: language change within language families often does not respect 
the postulated strong biases, and language families show distinctly different 
tendencies of their own (Dunn et al. 2011).
The upshot is that although there are clear tendencies for languages to have 
certain structural confi gurations, much of this patterning may be due entirely to 
 cultural evolution (i.e., to inheritance and elaboration during the processes of 
historical language change and diversifi cation). All the languages of the world 
outside Africa ultimately derive (judging from genetic bottlenecks) from a very 
small number that left Africa at the time of the diaspora of modern humans not 
later than ca. 70,000 years ago, with the possible proviso that interbreeding 
with  Neanderthals and  Denisovans (now known to have occurred) could have 
amplifi ed the original diversity (Dediu and Levinson 2013).1
There are three important implications. First, we have underestimated the 
power of  cultural transmission: using modern bioinformatic techniques we can 
now show that languages can retain strong signals of cultural phylogeny for 
10,000 years or more (Dunn et al. 2005; Pagel 2009). Consequently, language 
variation may tell us more about historical process than about innate constraints 
on the language capacity. Those seeking parallels between music and language 
be warned: in neither case do we have a clear overview of the full range of 
diverse cultural traditions, universal tendencies within each domain, and in-
trinsic connections across those tendencies. Over the last fi ve years, linguists 
have made signifi cant progress in compiling databases refl ecting (as yet still 
in a patchy way) perhaps a third of the linguistic diversity in the world, but no 
corresponding database of  ethnomusicological variation is even in progress.2
Second, the observed diversity is inconsistent with an innate “language ca-
pacity” or universal grammar, which specifi es the structure of human language 
in anything like the detail imagined, for example, by the “government and 
binding” or “principles and parameters” frameworks in linguistics (Chomsky 
1 The recently discovered Denisovans were a sister clade to Neanderthals, present in eastern 
Eurasia ca. 50 kya; they contributed genes to present-day Papuans, just like Neanderthals did 
to western Eurasians.
2 Useful leads will be found in Patel (2008:17ff), who points out that cultural variability in scale 
structure (numbers from 2–7 tones, differently spaced) and rhythm (2008:97ff) makes strong 
universals impossible. See also Nettl (2000), who quotes approvingly Herzog’s title “Musical 
Dialects: A Non-Universal Language.”
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1981; Baker 2001). Even the scaled-back Minimalist program makes claims 
about phrase structure that are ill-fi tted to the diversity of languages. There is 
no doubt a general “language readiness” special to the species, but this does 
not seem well captured by the major existing linguistic frameworks. We seem 
to be left with general architectural properties of languages (e.g., the map-
ping of  phonology to syntax, and syntax to semantics), abstract Hockettian 
“design features,” and perhaps with stronger universals at the sound and mean-
ing ends (i.e., phonology and semantics, the latter pretty unexplored) than in 
 morphosyntax.
Third, since the diversity rules out most proposed linguistic universals, we 
need to look elsewhere than “universal grammar” for the specifi c biological 
endowment that makes language possible for humans and not, apparently, for 
any other species. Apart from our general cognitive capacities, the most obvi-
ous feature is the anatomy and neurocognition of the vocal apparatus, and our 
vocal-learning abilities, rare or even unique among the primates.3 These input/
output specializations may drive the corresponding neurocognition, the loop 
between motor areas and the temporal lobe. They may even, during human 
development, help build the  arcuate fasciculus (the fi ber bundle that links the 
frontal lobes with the temporal lobes, i.e., very approximately, Broca’s and 
Wernicke’s areas; Brauer et al. 2011b).4 The neural circuitry involved in  lan-
guage processing may thus have been “recycled,” rather than evolved, for the 
function (Dehaene and Cohen 2007).
Only slightly less obvious is a set of abilities and propensities that are the es-
sential precondition for language: advanced  theory of mind (ToM) and coopera-
tive motivations and abilities for coordinated interaction, which together form 
the background to  social learning and makes possible both culture in general and 
the learning of specifi c languages. These aspects of cognition and, in particular, 
the grasp of Gricean communication (meaningnn) seem to have their own neural 
circuitry, distinct from vocal circuitry and mirror neuron circuitry (Noordzij et 
al. 2010).5 These interactional abilities are much more central to language than 
previously thought; together with vocal learning, they provide the essential plat-
form both for cultural elaboration of language and for infants to bootstrap them-
selves into the local linguistic system. Correspondingly, they may play some 
3 See, however, Masataka and Fujita (1989) for monkey parallels.
4 The crucial experiment—checking on the development of these structures in deaf children and 
home-signers—has not to my knowledge been done.
5  Gricean signaling (producing a noninstrumental action whose sole purpose is to have its  inten-
tion recognized) is a kind of second-order  mirror system:  perception (decoding) depends on (a) 
seeing the noninstrumental character of the signal, and (b) simulating what effect the signaler 
intended to cause in the recipient just by recognition of that intention. Consider my signaling 
to you at breakfast that you have egg on your chin just by energetically rubbing my chin: a 
fi rst-order mirror interpretation is that I have, say, egg on my chin; a second-order one is that 
I’m telling you that it is on your chin.
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parallel role in musical learning and  performance. They have preceded modern 
language in both ontogeny and phylogeny, which we turn to next.
The Timescale of the Evolution of Speech and Language
In  a metastudy drawing on the most recent discoveries, we have argued that 
the origins of these vocal abilities can be traced back over half a million years 
to  Homo heidelbergensis, who exhibited a modern human vocal tract, mod-
ern breathing control, modern audiograms, and the  FOXP2 variants inherited 
in common by his descendants:  Neanderthals,  Denisovans, and modern hu-
mans (Dediu and Levinson 2013). At 1.6 mya,  H. erectus lacked these vocal 
specializations but exhibited control of fi re and complex tool traditions (the 
Acheulian or Mode 2 type), arguing for a communication system able to sup-
port advanced cultural learning. Such a system presupposes the cooperative 
interaction style of humans, which in turn relies on advanced  ToM capacities. 
Therefore, H. erectus (or H. ergaster as some prefer to call the African vari-
ant) had some quite advanced form of language that was less vocally special-
ized than that used by H. heidelbergensis. H. erectus, in turn, is the presumed 
descendant of H. habilis, who already used a varied stone tool kit at 2.5 mya, 
with the fi rst stone tools in use as early as 3.4 mya. Thus  social learning and 
 cooperative communication have deep phylogenetic roots. 
Speech and language, as we know them, evolved in the million years time 
between 1.5 mya–0.5 mya (Dediu and Levinson 2013). Modern language is 
thus of a much greater antiquity than usually assumed (Klein 1999; Chomsky 
2007, 2010 presume the last 50–100 kya). Nevertheless, from a geological or 
genetic time perspective, a million years pales in comparison to the 50 million 
years existence of birdsong or bat echolocation: language has been able to de-
velop so fast because much of its complexity was outsourced to  cultural evolu-
tion. There is, however, a deep biological infrastructure for human language: 
the vocal-auditory system, on the one hand, and the cooperative communica-
tive instincts, on the other, on which cultural elaboration is based.
Most importantly, a fully cooperative communication system and interac-
tion style evolved gradually in our line over the three million years of  tool use 
leading up to H. heidelbergensis. Judging from the development of material 
culture, ToM capacities and advanced cooperative abilities are very ancient, 
tied to increasing encephalization and group size. They are the crib for lan-
guage in both phylogeny and ontogeny.
Two controversial issues should be raised here. First, the Darwinian view 
that speech evolved not for language but for musical use, with  songbirds as 
the animal model, has recently been revived, for example, by Mithen (2005) 
and Fitch (2009b). This view is, to my mind, a nonstarter. As just explained, 
our speech system evolved after at least a million years of functional com-
munication geared to handing on cultural learning and tool traditions. The 
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preconditions for culture involved prolonged infancy, intensive cooperative 
 social interaction, and the large social groups that motivated increased en-
cephalization. It is not plausible that all this developed without some kind of 
 protolanguage. Thus language (perhaps in gestural form) preceded speech, not 
the other way around as Darwin had imagined. Thus,  songbirds probably do 
not provide the right analogy; vocal learners among more social species (e.g., 
sea mammals) may provide a better animal model (for a contrary view, see 
Fitch and Jarvis, this volume). 
The second controversial issue is indeed the possible gestural origin of  lan-
guage (cf. Arbib 2005a, b). If language was carried by a medium other than 
fully articulate and voluntarily controlled  speech for a million years or more, 
 gesture is a prime candidate. Call and Tomasello (2007) make a good case 
for gesture being the voluntary, fl exible medium of communication for apes, 
with vocal calls being more refl ex. On phylogenetic grounds, then, one might 
indeed argue for gestural precursors to language. However, fi rst, there is no 
specialization of the hand for communication that parallels the evolution of 
the vocal system, which one would expect if it played such a crucial role. 
Second, the human communication system is properly thought of as based on 
hand + mouth, allowing greater loading of the hand (as in  sign languages) or of 
the mouth (as in spoken languages), but always involving both. It is therefore 
likely that this joint system has great antiquity. What seems plausible is that 
during the million years preceding  H. heidelbergensis (by which time speech 
was fully formed), the burden of communication was shifted relatively from 
hand to mouth. More generally, human communication is intrinsically multi-
modal, as refl ected, for example, in the general purpose nature of  Broca’s area 
(Hagoort 2005).
The Interactive Niche
Every language is learned in  face-to-face interaction in a special context that 
is unique to the species. Most animals avert  gaze except in aggression; in con-
trast, within restrictions, mutual gaze is tolerated or even required in many 
kinds of human interaction (for a cross-cultural study, see Rossano et al. 2009). 
This is a token of the presumption of cooperation which operates (again with 
limitations) in intragroup human interaction—a persistent puzzle from an evo-
lutionary point of view (Boyd and Richerson 2005). Under this cooperative 
envelope, interaction consists of a sequenced exchange of actions, following 
specifi c turn-taking rules geared to the structure of minimal contributions (e.g., 
clauses in spoken communication), and which permit one action at a time (see 
Sacks et al. 1974). The expectation is that each such action unit is tied to the 
prior one by a “logic” of action: a request is met with a compliance or denial; 
a greeting by a greeting; a question with an answer or evasion; a pointing by a 
gaze following; and so forth. The structure of  action sequences can be complex, 
From “Language, Music, and the Brain,” edited by Michael A. Arbib. 
2013. Strüngmann Forum Reports, vol. 10, J. Lupp, series ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 978-0-262-01810-4. 
 Cross-Cultural Universals and Communication Structures 73
arguably as or more complex than anything seen in natural language syntax, as 
we shall see. Yet an elementary system of this kind is visible in the earliest pre-
linguistic  mother–infant interaction (“proto-conversation,” Bruner 1975; for 
resonances in the musical domain, see Malloch and Trevarthen 2009).
This interactional envelope is the context in which the great bulk of lan-
guage use occurs; monologue is the exception, and in some societies hardly 
occurs at all.  Narrative, likewise, plays a small role, statistically speaking, in 
the use of language. The basic niche for language is the tit-for-tat of informal 
conversation: action–response, action–response, and so on. It is intriguing to 
wonder what the equivalent natural ecological niche for music might be; per-
haps  Western music, with its division of performers and audience, is entirely 
misleading, like comparing lecturing to the natural niche for language use.
Two aspects of this interactional envelope are much more complex and in-
tricate than meets the eye. The fi rst is turn-taking. The fact that turns at talking 
alternate seems at fi rst quite trivial, but consider this: the gap between turns is 
on average 200 ms across a wide variety of languages (and the mode offset be-
tween turns is 0 ms, without any gap at all, in all languages tested; Stivers et al. 
2009). Since it takes at least 600 ms to crank up the speech production system, 
speakers must be anticipating the last words of their interlocutors’ turns; they 
must also predict the content in order to respond appropriately (direct EEG 
measurement suggests actual launch of production is quite a bit earlier than 
this on average). The whole system is built on predicting what the other will 
say part way through the saying of it, and since what is said has all the open-
endedness that syntax delivers, this is no mean feat. This system exerts tremen-
dous cognitive demands: comprehension and production must run in parallel, 
at least part of the time (see Figure 3.1). It is perhaps not fanciful to imagine 
that this universal pace or fi xed metabolism of the turn-taking system was set 
up early in the phylogeny of  protolanguage, so that we inherit a system ill-
adapted to the complexity of the structures we now thrust into these short turns.
The second complexity is  action sequencing: questions expect answers, re-
quests compliance, offers acceptances, etc. This requires recognizing a turn 
as a question, early enough in its production to allow time to formulate the 
response. This recognition might be imagined to be based on  syntax or lexical 
cues, but corpus work shows, for example, that most questions in English are 
yes-no questions, and most of these are in declarative form with falling  intona-
tion. So, most questions are recognized by means other than direct linguistic 
Time
600–1200 ms
200 ms gapA’s turn
B’s production planning B’s turn
Figure 3.1  Overlap of comprehension and production processes in conversation.
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cues, for example by noting that B is making a statement about a subject for 
which he knows I have more knowledge (e.g., “You’ve had breakfast”). The 
same holds for most kinds of speech acts: they don’t come wrapped in some 
canonical fl ag. This problem of “indirect speech acts” has been neglected since 
the 1970s, but it is the fundamental comprehension problem: the speech act is 
what the hearer needs to extract to respond in the tight temporal frame required 
by the turn-taking system. Likewise, the whole function of language is often 
misconstrued: the job of language is not to deliver abstract propositions but to 
deliver speech acts.
Since the job of language is to deliver actions explains, of course, why 
speech comes interleaved with nonverbal actions in any ordinary interchange: 
I say “Hi”; you smile and ring up my purchases saying, “You know you can 
get two of these for the price of one”; I explain that one will do and hand you 
a bill; you say “Have a good day.” Words and deeds are the same kind of inter-
actional currency, which is why language understanding is just a special kind 
of action understanding. In cooperative interaction, responses are aimed at the 
underlying action goals or plans. Consider the telephone call in Example 3.1 
(Schegloff 2007:30):
1. Caller:  Hi.
2. Responder: Hi.
3. Caller:   Whatcha doin’?
4. Responder:  Not much.
5. Caller:  Y’wanna drink?
6. Responder:  Yeah.
7. Caller:  Okay.
(3.1) 
Line 3 might look like an idle query, but it is not treated as one: the response 
“Not much” clearly foresees the upcoming invitation in line 5 and makes clear 
that there is not much impediment to such an invitation, which is then naturally 
forthcoming. Conversation analysts call turns like line 3 a “pre-invitation,” 
and show with recurrent examples that such turns have the character of condi-
tional offers. Just as the caller can hardly say at line 5 “Oh just asking,” so the 
responder will fi nd it hard to refuse the invitation she has encouraged by giv-
ing the “go-ahead” at line 4 (although a counterproposal might be in order at 
line 6). The underlying structure of such a simple interchange, translated into 
hierarchical action goals, might look something like the sketch in Figure 3.2, 
where Whatcha doin’ acquires its pre-invitation character from a projection of 
what it might be leading to.
 Action attribution thus plays a key role in the use of language and is based 
quite largely on unobservables, like the adumbrated next action if I respond 
to this one in such a way. The process is clearly based on advanced  ToM 
capacities, and beyond that on the presumption that my interlocutor has de-
signed his turn precisely to be transparent in this regard. This, of course, is 
 Grice’s insight, his theory of meaningnn: human communicative signals work 
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by presenting an action designed to have its  intention recognized, where that 
recognition exhausts the intention. In recent work, we have tried to isolate the 
neural circuitry involved in just this process and fi nd it distinct from either 
the language circuitry or the mirror neuron circuits (Noordzij et al. 2010): we 
fi nd overlapping areas of activation in the posterior superior temporal sulcus, 
in mirror-like fashion, in both signaler and receiver, interpreted as signaler’s 
simulation of recipient’s inferencing.6
The inferential character of action ascription makes it a complex process. 
However, an unexpected further order of complexity is that it has a quasi 
6 As a way to generalize over these observations and the classic mirror neuron system, it may be 
helpful to think (in a slightly different way than Arbib 2005b) of a hierarchy of  action–percep-
tion mirror loops, as follows:
 degree 0 (intra-organism): Action–perception feedback, as in proprioception or auditory feed-
back of one’s own production, allows cybernetic feedback. Highly evolved systems include 
echolocation in bats and cetaceans.
 degree 1 (cross-organism):  Classic mirror neuron system: other’s action recognition and self-
action use overlapping neural resources. This can be further distinguished into degree 1.1 
instinctive systems and degree 1.2 learned systems. Mouth mirror neurons might offer a 
route to  vocal learning (Arbib 2005b:118).
 degree 2 (cross-organism):  Gricean simulation systems: applies to actions that self-advertise 
that they are signals (noninstrumental actions), so discounting mirror neuron systems of 
degree 1. Works by the recipient simulating what the signaler calculated the recipient would 














Figure 3.2  Action assignment based on plan recognition (see Example 3.1). Arrows 
indicate direction of inference from what is said to what is likely to come up next, which 
then “colors” the interpretation of the present turn.
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syntax (Levinson 1981). Consider the following simple exchange in Example 
3.2 (Merritt 1976):
A: Q1 “May I have a bottle of Mich?”




This has a pushdown stack character: Q1 is paired with A1, but Q2–A2 inter-
venes. Many further levels of embedding are possible, and they can be charac-
terized, of course, by the phrase-structure-grammar in Example 3.3:
Q&A  Q (Q&A) A
Q&A  Q A (3.3) 
What is interesting is that this kind of  center embedding has been thought to 
be one of the pinnacles of human language  syntax. An exhaustive search of all 
available large language corpora has yielded, however, the following fi nding: 
the greatest number of recursive center embeddings in spoken languages is 
precisely 2, whereas in written languages the number is maximally 3 (Karlsson 
[2007] has found exactly 13 cases in the whole of Western literature).7
In contrast, it is trivial to fi nd examples of center embeddings of 3 or great-
er depth in interaction structure. Example 3.4 (abbreviated from Levinson 
1983:305) shows one enquiry embedded within another, and a “hold-OK” se-
quence (labeled 3) within that:
C: .. I ordered some paint… some vermillion… And I wanted to order some 
more, the name’s Boyd
R: .. Yes how many tubes would you like sir?
C: .. What’s the price now with VAT?
R: I’ll just work that out for you
C: Thanks
(10.0)
R: Three pounds nineteen a tube sir
C: Three nineteen is it=
R: Yeah
C: That’s for the large tube?
R: Well yeah it’s the 37 ccs






Examples 6 deep or more can arguably be found in  conversation. When one 
fi nds a domain in which a cognitive facility is most enhanced, it is reasonable 
to assume that this is the home in which it originally developed. The implica-
tion is that core  recursion—as expressed in center embedding—has its origin 
7 More precisely, Karlsson (2007) calls one center embedding “degree 1,” a center embedding 
within a center embedding “degree 2,” and shows that degree 2 is the maximal attested depth 
for spoken languages, degree 3 for written texts.
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in interaction systems, not in natural language  syntax. Exactly parallel argu-
ments can, I believe, be made for so-called cross-serial dependencies, vanish-
ingly rare in syntax but exhibited recurrently in conversational structure.8 Why 
exactly it is so much easier to keep track of discontinuous dependencies in 
 joint action than in solitary performance remains unclear; the mental registers 
required would seem to be the same, but the distributed production clearly 
helps cognition in some way.
More generally, the implication is that we have minds engineered for ex-
traordinary coordination in joint action (see Fogassi, this volume). It may be 
interesting to reconsider music in this light: not as, in origin, a solitary enter-
prise or a  performance to a passive audience, but as an interchange between 
actors, where guessing the next phrase is crucial to coming in on time, where 
one performer “answers” another, where the basic units are seen as “actions” 
rather than formal objects, and where extremes of  coordination carry a deep 
satisfaction of their own (see Janata and Parsons, this volume). This suggests 
improvisational jazz as the model, not the sonata or the lullaby.
Language and Music
Sixty years ago the great anthropologist Levi-Strauss pointed out that music is 
the central mystery of  anthropology.9 Nothing has changed since. Contrary to 
the Chomskyan idea that language is a late evolutionary freak, a spandrel from 
some other evolutionary development, the fossil and archaeological record 
actually shows a steady, slow accumulation of culture which was only made 
possible by some increasingly sophisticated mode of communication, already 
essentially modern and primarily in the vocal channel by 0.5 million years ago 
(pretty much as Pinker and Bloom 1990 imagined on more slender evidence). 
But what is the story for music?
To what extent could music be parasitic on language, or more broadly on 
our communicative repertoire? First, some basic points. In small-scale soci-
eties with simple technology, music often equals song: that is to say, music 
only occurs with language. It is often imagined that music always involves 
instruments, but again small-scale societies often have no instruments, in some 
cases also avoiding any form of ancillary percussion (as in the elaborate, but 
purely vocal, range of  song styles of  Rossel Island, Papua New Guinea).10 
Phoneticians often distinguish language,  prosody, and  paralanguage, where the 
latter two are suprasegmental properties of  speech (roughly tonal and wide 
8 Cross-serial dependencies have the form A1–B1–A2–B2 where the linkages cross over. Ex-
ample 3.1 contains such a pattern, but I leave that as an exercise for the reader.
9 Compare Darwin (1871:333) “As neither the enjoyment nor the capacity of producing musical 
notes are faculties of the least direct use to man in reference to his ordinary  habits of life, they 
must be ranked amongst the most mysterious with which he is endowed.”
10 The Rossel Island observations come from my own ethnographic work.
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timbre qualities, respectively), only partially bound into the linguistic system 
in rule-governed ways (see Ladd, this volume). Song is in a sense just lan-
guage in a special, marked suprasegmental register or style or genre.  Rossel 
Islanders, for example, do not have a category of “music” that would place 
each of their named types of song style (e.g., tpile we, “operetta”; ntamê, “sa-
cred chants”; yaa, “laments”) in opposition to speech of other types (e.g., wii, 
“fast-declaimed  poetry”). It is thought-provoking to realize that “music” seems 
to be an ethnocentric category (Nettl 2000:466).
We are hampered, as mentioned, by having no ethnomusical databases that 
cover the world, but it is likely that song is in the unmarked case not a solo 
performance, but a joint activity involving a chorus (Nettl 2000).11 Most of the 
 song styles on Rossel Island, for example, are joint performances sung in uni-
son, with the exception of  laments (yaa) which are composed and sung by in-
dividuals, typically at funerals. This contrasts with normal conversation, which 
is composed from individual, short turns with rapid alternation. Song is thus a 
marked genre, in being predominantly jointly performed in unison (which is a 
rare, but observable occurrence in conversation, as in greetings or joint laugh-
ter). In some circumstances, but not all, song is like  speech-giving, a  perfor-
mance by a set of performers with a designated audience. Linguistic systems 
make a lot of distinctions between speakers, addressees, auditors, and the like, 
originally explored by Goffman (1981, Chapter 3). For example, when I say, 
“The next candidate is to come in now,” the syntax projects a second speech 
event, indicating that I am instructing you to go and ask the candidate on my 
behalf (see Levinson 1988). The same distinctions are relevant for song: both a 
song and a speech may be authored by one individual on behalf of another (the 
principal) and performed by a third (as in the praise songs of West Africa; see 
Charry 2000). In Rossel Island laments, author, principal, and mouthpiece are 
identical; sacred hymns (ntamê), however, are composed by the gods and sung 
by elder males to a precise formula, to a male-only audience.
Song, surely the original form of music,12 makes clear the possibly parasitic 
nature of music on language: the tonal and rhythmic structure must to some ex-
tent be fi tted to the structure of the language. The language of the lyrics deter-
mines both aspects of the fi ne-grained structure, the affectual quality matched 
to the words, and the overall structure, for example, the timing of subunits and 
nature of the ending (e.g., the number of verses).
The perspective adopted here, emphasizing the role of language in its pri-
mordial conversational niche, also suggests a possible take on the  cultural 
(and possibly biological) evolution of music. The motivation for and structural 
complexity of music may have its origins in joint action rather than in abstract 
representations or solitary mentation. It may also rely on  Gricean refl exive 
11 Patel (2008:371), however, reports one Papuan society where song is largely private and covert.
12 The assumption makes the prediction that no cultural system of musical genres will be found 
without song genres (see Nettl 2000).
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 mirroring or simulation to achieve the  empathy that seems to drive it,13 to-
gether with the apparently magical coordination through prediction which is 
one source of the pleasure it gives. The rhythmic properties may owe at least 
something to the rapidity of  turn-taking, the underlying mental metabolism, 
and the interactional  rhythms that are set up by turn-taking. The multimodality 
of human communication allows the natural recruitment of additional chan-
nels, whether multiple voices or instrumental accompaniments, and of course 
dance (Janata and Parsons, this volume).
Still, few will be satisfi ed with the notion that music is, even in origin, just 
a special kind of speech (see Wallin et al. 2000; Morley 2011). They will point 
to the existence of (largely) independent cultural traditions of instrumental 
music, to the special periodic rhythms of music, and to its hotline to our emo-
tions (Patel 2008). One speculation might be based on the Call and Tomasello 
(2007:222) argument that in the Hominidae, with the sole exception of hu-
mans, vocal calls are  instinctive, refl ex, and affectual (“Vocalizations are typi-
cally hardwired and used with very little fl exibility, broadcast loudly to much 
of the social group at once—who are then infected with the emotion;” see also 
Scherer, this volume), in contrast to the  gestural system which is more inten-
tionally communicative and socially manipulative. If language began in the 
gestural channel and slowly, between 1.5–0.5 million years ago, moved more 
prominently into the vocal channel, it is possible that the vocal channel retains 
an ancient, involuntary, affective substrate. Note, for example, how laughter 
and crying exhibit periodic rhythms of a kind not found in language and are 
exempt from the regular turn-taking of speech. It could be this substrate to 
which music appeals, using all the artifi ce that culture has devised to titillate 
this system. Drugs—culturally developed chemicals—work by stimulating 
some preexisting reward centers. The ancient affective call system could be 
the addiction music feeds.14
Conclusion
The theory of language, properly reconstructed, yields much of the com-
plexity of linguistic structure over to cultural evolution, seeking biological 
roots primarily in the auditory-vocal system and the species-special form of 
13  Gricean refl exive intentions may play a larger role in music than is obvious: Performers “work” 
an audience, intending to induce a feeling partly by affective evocation, but partly by getting 
the audience to realize that is what they are trying to do. This accounts for the difference 
between a recording and a live performance—the performer tries to persuade the particular 
audience to adopt the affective state intended. Thus all three types of action–perception loop 
mentioned in footnote 6 may apply equally well to music.
14 A recent study of musical “chills” shows striking similarity with cocaine highs, providing 
“neurochemical evidence that intense emotional responses to music involve ancient reward 
circuitry” (Salimpoor et al. 2011).
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communicational abilities in cooperative interaction. What is peripheral in cur-
rent linguistic theory (speech and pragmatics) should be central; what is central 
in much theory ( syntax) may be more peripheral. Syntaxes are, I have suggest-
ed, language-specifi c cultural elaborations with partial origins in the interac-
tional system, within bounds set by aspects of general cognition (Christiansen 
and Chater 2008). Viewed in this light, the relation of language to music shifts. 
The vocal origins of music may ultimately be tied to the instinctual affective 
vocal system found in apes, while the joint action and performance aspects 
may be connected to the interactional base for language. Just as syntaxes are 
artifacts honed over generations of cultural evolution, so are the great musical 
traditions.
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